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 Introduction 
 What is the philosophy of medicine? What problems does this discipline solve 
and how does it go about solving them? There are some, of course, who still 
maintain that philosophy has no business whatsoever in medicine, the latt er 
being a science, and the former being the sort of idle speculation one engages 
in when lacking sound research evidence for one’s conclusions. As one inter-
net blogger  1  puts it, philosophy is “largely ignored by science.” In a charac-
teristically simplistic and dismissive account of the views of two renowned 
philosophers of science, John Worrall and Nancy Cartwright, on the nature of 
causality, the blogger quips: 
 Many words are spent on defi ning causality but, at least in the clinical sett ing 
the meaning is perfectly simple. If the association between eating bacon and 
colorectal cancer is causal then if you stop eating bacon you’ll reduce the 
risk of cancer. If the relationship is not causal then if you stop eating bacon it 
won’t help at all. No amount of Worrall’s ‘serious thought’ will substitute for 
the real evidence for causality that can come only from an RCT.  2  
 It is symptomatic of the blogger’s disdain for philosophical methods that he 
sees no reason to defend his own conception of science, and thinks that banal or 
“common sense” observations about bacon substitute for any eﬀ orts to under-
stand, let alone to respond to, the quite extraordinarily detailed arguments on 
the nature of science and causal explanations developed by the thinkers he 
swiftly dismisses. On such a view the philosophy of medicine is presumably 
something one does if lacking the scientifi c background to do real medicine, 
and the idea of “research problems and methods in the philosophy of medi-
cine” represents something of an oxymoron. 
 Research Problems and 
Methods in the Philosophy 
of Medicine 
 Michael  Loughlin ,  Robyn  Bluhm , 
 and Mona   Gupta 
 2 
9781474233002_txt.indd   29 8/10/2016   8:27:34 PM
The Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Medicine
30
30
 The willingness to examine critically one’s own underlying assumptions is 
a prerequisite for engaging in philosophical thinking and discourse (Loughlin 
et al., 2015 ). It is therefore not unreasonable to expect authors in any area of 
applied philosophy to have considered the nature and limitations of their 
activity and its relationship with the practices it hopes to inform. While these 
anti- philosophical ideas about the relationship between medicine, science, and 
philosophy do not, we believe, stand up to serious intellectual scrutiny, they 
do represent a conceptual framework with a lengthy intellectual heritage, and 
one whose infl uence needs to be understood if we are to confront the methodo-
logical questions facing the philosophy of medicine. Were such responses con-
fi ned to the blog pages of a bizarre, secular science counterpart to the Reverend 
Fred Phelps  3  they could perhaps be ignored. But the very fact that they can be 
articulated— and treated as eﬀ ectively “just plain obvious”— in such popular 
media (on a site that apparently commands a large following) is indicative of 
their pervasive infl uence. 
 We return to the issue of causation in medicine later in this chapter, and 
hopefully say enough to indicate that the issue is not perfectly simple, nor have 
the signifi cant controversies on this question been resolved.  4  The claim that we 
need evidence (indeed, real evidence) to answer causal questions in medicine 
is what is known as a “platitude”: no reasonable person could dispute it. In 
contrast, the assertion that only a randomized controlled trial (RCT) can pro-
vide evidence relevant to the causal reasoning that necessarily informs clinical 
decision- making is not only controversial, but apparently represents what a 
prominent defender of evidence- based medicine (EBM) describes, in his contri-
bution to this volume, as a “straw man” version of EBM (see Jeremy Howick, 
 chapter 5 ). In his view, even the more popular and credible position, that RCTs 
provide bett er evidence than observational studies and/ or mechanistic reason-
ing, needs modifi cation if it is to be intellectually defensible. Whatever one 
thinks of this argument, the insertion of the otherwise superfl uous qualifi er 
“real” in the earlier quotation is indicative of an implicit philosophical claim. 
While practitioners in all manner of clinical contexts might treat context- specifi c 
features of situations as vital evidence about causal factors aﬀ ecting the symp-
toms patients present (Greenhalgh  2012 ; Macnaughton 2011 ), the only seman-
tic content supplied by the term “real” here is to imply a contrast, to express 
the background assumption that such forms of evidence are  not real— that the 
information such personal observations embody cannot qualify for the term 
“evidence” in the way that the results of RCTs can. Of course, the only defense 
of this claim in the blog derives from running it together with a platitudin-
ous declaration that we need evidence as the basis for causal conclusions, and 
given the blogger’s avowed disdain for philosophy, he is unable to recognize, 
let alone defend, his own distinctly philosophical commitments. 
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 Ironically, it is from academic philosophy itself that such anti- philosophical 
ideas originate. The idea that the only source of real knowledge is a fairly nar-
rowly defi ned conception of empirical science owes its intuitive plausibility to 
what is sometimes called the “legacy of positivism” (Achinstein and Barker, 
1969 ) and an associated atomistic approach to knowledge that has had a pro-
found eﬀ ect on the development of biomedicine (Macnaughton,  2011 ). Logical 
positivism (or empiricism) bolstered the view that only empirical data acquired 
in certain specifi c ways could provide objective evidence, giving rise to an intel-
lectual culture in which judgment, personal experience, and context- specifi c 
information were regarded with suspicion as subjective factors (Kirkengen and 
Thornquist,  2012 ; Loughlin et al., 2013). While this philosophical position has 
been subjected to extensive criticism, and the problems it creates for scientifi c 
practice have been well documented (Kincaid et al.,  2007 ; Maxwell,  2004 ; Nagel, 
 1986 ), there is no consensus regarding the most appropriate alternative epis-
temological framework to understand the relationship between science, know-
ledge, experience, theory, judgment, and value. Indeed, the debate between 
broadly empiricist and rival rationalist positions in epistemology is far from 
being resolved, and we discuss the specifi c implications of this debate for cur-
rent accounts of medical causality later in this chapter. 
 What is more, there are serious questions about the nature and status of 
the philosophy of medicine, and there is by no means a general consensus in 
the area as to how they are resolved. Two features of philosophy contribute 
to this situation. First, the already noted characteristic trait of the philosopher 
to examine underlying assumptions. Second, another required trait of consist-
ency: to be a philosopher is to be willing to follow a line of thinking to its logical 
conclusion, however uncomfortable or counter- intuitive it may initially appear. 
 In combination, these two features lead philosophers themselves to ask dif-
fi cult questions about what philosophy is— what its methods are, what sort 
of questions it can meaningfully answer, and consequently its limitations as 
a form of academic enquiry. It was this ruthless consistency that led logical 
positivists, infl uenced by ideas inherited from the great empiricist philosophers 
Locke and Hume, to conclude that it was not the business of philosophy to dis-
cover truths, but simply to solve (linguistic) puzzles, so as to assist in the pro-
ject of empirical science— the only means for discovering genuine, non- trivial 
truths (Ayer,  1987 , pp. 34– 35). Arguably, under the leadership of the positivists, 
academic philosophy became something of a suicidal discipline, dismissing the 
questions that preoccupied its greatest thinkers over the centuries— about the 
nature of reality, the value of life, how human beings should live and practice— 
as either meaningless or purely subjective, in some cases apparently reveling 
in the practical irrelevance of its increasingly obscure, exclusive, technical dis-
course (Loughlin,  2002 , pp. 119– 26). 
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 Key to arriving at this suicidal conclusion was the positivists’ model of phil-
osophical methodology, typically characterized as deductivist because it eﬀ ec-
tively equates rational argument— the presentation of  good reasons to believe 
a conclusion— with logical validity. A deductively valid argument is one in 
which the conclusion follows logically from the premises presented, meaning 
that to deny the conclusion while asserting the truth of the premises is to be 
guilty of a formal contradiction. Hume’s consistent application of the view of 
knowledge and reasoning as consisting, strictly, in the processes of observation 
and deduction led him ultimately to question the rational basis of so many of 
our everyday beliefs that the plausibility of his own conception of reasoning 
was itself called into question. 
 Hume is credited with discovering the problem of induction, noting that 
our inherent disposition to discover patt erns in experience, to see particular 
conjunctions of events as indicative of broader, general, or universal laws, goes 
beyond the processes of observation and deduction, and therefore would seem 
to be non- rational. While we may be happy to regard the patt erns observed by 
the witch- doctor (or perhaps the homeopath) as unwarranted generalizations 
lacking any rational basis, as Russell (1967, p. 38) famously notes, unless we 
regard induction as an inherently rational process, we must “forego all justi-
fi cations of our expectations about the future,” in which case we would have 
to admit that “we have no reason to expect the sun to rise tomorrow, to expect 
bread to be more nourishing than a stone, or to expect that if we throw our-
selves oﬀ  the roof we shall fall.” 
 No one denies that rationality  minimally requires the avoidance of contradic-
tion and compatibility with empirical evidence. But if we limit our conception 
of reasoning to these essential characteristics, then we risk regarding as non- 
rational the human capacities and dispositions that make us able to distinguish 
good generalizations from bad (and consequently science from prejudice and 
superstition) and that enable us to be both good reasoners and good observers 
in practice: 
 Consider the claim that “my mother is unhappy today.” I might come to 
believe this on the basis of certain evidence: her facial expressions, the tone 
of her voice, her mannerisms as she goes about certain mundane tasks. The 
fact that someone who does not know her so well might encounter the same 
behaviour but fail to come to the same conclusion shows that the evidence for 
the claim does not logically entail the conclusion. (Loughlin,  2002 , pp. 40– 41) 
 Does it follow that such evidence does not provide us with a good reason to 
believe the conclusion, that it is not real evidence? Would a principled refusal 
to accept such evidence make us bett er, more rigorous thinkers or bad practi-
tioners and (more generally) practically inept human beings? If a theory about 
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rationality causes us to reject the use of our interpretive and other human facul-
ties that in fact make practical reasoning possible, then we have reason to reject 
that view of rationality.  5  
 Despite these problems, deductivism in its various forms has had a huge 
infl uence on thinking about clinical reasoning, eﬀ ectively determining the 
methodological assumptions of dominant approaches to both medical episte-
mology and medical ethics. Tonelli ( 2014 ) points out that, in EBM, the results 
of empirical research function as the major premises from which conclusions 
about particular cases are deduced, while in biomedical ethics, the approach 
called “principlism” att empts to derive particular conclusions from the applica-
tion of general principles, whose justifi cation is presumably either self- evidence 
or just their general acceptability. (Though for the positivist, no major moral 
premise, however widely accepted, can claim anything other than “subjec-
tive” justifi cation, rendering the whole idea of “moral reasoning” inherently 
problematic.) 
 Though overused and misused by some authors,  6  the phrase associated with 
Toulmin ( 1982 ), that medicine “saved the life” of philosophy, has more than 
a ring of truth about it. Toulmin argued that by returning their att ention to 
the concrete— to the problems of particular, real cases in medical discourse— 
philosophers had found their subject “coming alive again” and had regained 
the sense of engagement with practical matt ers that had characterized the dis-
courses of Socrates and Aristotle. Toulmin’s specifi c focus was on the revival 
of moral philosophy: “By reintroducing into ethical debate the vexed topics 
raised by particular cases, they [medicine and law] have obliged philosophers 
to address once again the Aristotelian problems of practical reasoning, which 
had been on the sidelines for too long” (p. 749). Instead of regarding moral phi-
losophy as a body of theory, and then raising skeptical questions about how, if 
at all, this body could be applied to the real world, (what practical conclusions, 
if any, could be deduced from its major premises, etc.), philosophers engaging 
in interdisciplinary debate treated philosophy as an activity— a style of think-
ing that enables us to describe the logical structure of arguments, to identify 
and analyze key assumptions and concepts, and to clarify debates by exposing 
ambiguities and errors of reasoning. As Toulmin notes (with practical illustra-
tions), in making this contribution to a genuine  dialog with practitioners, philos-
ophers were sometimes able to assist in discovering a level of consensus about 
the (non- trivial) truth in particular cases that would astonish the positivists and 
ethical subjectivists. 
 It was not only ethics that stood in need of revival, nor could its revival 
be achieved in artifi cial separation from other aspects of philosophical think-
ing. Ethical questions— about what we should do in any given situation— are 
embedded within whole understandings of the situation, inseparable from 
our beliefs about what is the case (the traditional concern of those areas of 
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philosophy termed “ontology” or “metaphysics”), what it is that we feel we can 
claim to know (epistemology), and our broader beliefs about reasoning (logic), 
as well as the meaning we ascribe to diﬀ erent aspects of the situation or to 
our perception of it (phenomenology) (Loughlin et al., 2015 , p. 358). Since the 
publication of Toulmin’s paper, medicine and healthcare have raised a host of 
pressing problems about the nature of health, disease, care, clinical judgment, 
evidence, causation, reasoning, and knowledge in clinical practice and the rela-
tionships between scientifi c explanations of disorder and human experience. 
Just as Socrates found in the marketplace scope to explore with his interlocutors 
the vast range of questions that formed the canon of philosophy, so, by apply-
ing their critical and analytical skills to debates in medicine and healthcare, 
contemporary philosophers have regained what Toulmin ( 1982 ) characterized 
as “a seriousness and human relevance” for their discipline. 
 Toulmin’s case- based approach to practical reasoning is often labeled casu-
istry, and its contemporary defenders note that it challenges some of the most 
entrenched assumptions of traditional analytical philosophy. In particular, it 
has been argued that casuistry problematizes the sharp distinction between fact 
and value, which owes its origins to the work of the empiricists (again, most 
notably Hume) and via the positivists has massively infl uenced the under-
standing of evidence in clinical medicine— in particular in the EBM movement. 
Tonelli ( 2014 , pp. 238– 40) argues that the fact– value dichotomy is a theoretical 
construct that can distort clinical reasoning. This is because, in real cases, there 
is no necessarily clear divide between factual and evaluative aspects of a situ-
ation: even our characterization of particular observed facts is bound up with 
explicit or implicit value- judgments. Whether or not we agree with this specifi c 
claim, it reminds us that the dialog between medicine and philosophy must be 
a genuine one, not a one- way process in which something called philosophi-
cal theory is applied to the resolution of practical problems, whose nature is 
(by implication) philosophically unproblematic (Loughlin,  2002 , pp. 143– 46). 
Even our description of a background situation, and the identifi cation of some 
features of it as representing the problem, embodies assumptions that can be 
questioned (see later) and theoretical distinctions can be called into question 
if they fail to serve some useful purpose: the way to defend them (if they are 
defensible) is to show that they do, in fact, contribute to a way of understanding 
a real situation that can help us to deal with it more adequately. 
 Critics of casuistry have focused on its ability, celebrated by Toulmin, to 
drive consensus in particular cases, arguing that this consensus can refl ect 
implicit shared values among the participants in a dialog— for instance, on 
what represents an adequate characterization of a problem and what it means 
to respond adequately to that problem (Kopelman,  1994 ). Unless these shared, 
underlying values are identifi ed and subjected to critical scrutiny, the process 
runs the risk of “self- confi rming bias” (Fulford,  2014 , p. 159). This criticism 
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raises serious and unresolved philosophical questions about the relationship 
between the consensus of belief in a given group, the truth of the matt er and 
what individuals have good reasons to believe. No credible defender of casu-
istry (certainly not those we have cited) would wish to defend the idea that the 
correct answer in any given case is defi ned with reference to an uncriticized 
consensus. The very idea of intellectual progress seems to depend on the will-
ingness of individuals to challenge the consensus on a given issue, to recognize 
that our shared assumptions at any given point in time may simply be wrong. 
To fail to consider this possibility is to become the sort of unrefl ective dogmatist 
criticized at the beginning of this chapter, to adopt the standing assumption 
that “intellectual history came to an end . . . at just the point that we arrived on 
the scene” (Loughlin et al., 2013, p. 136). 
 This is precisely why we stated the willingness to examine critically one’s 
own assumptions as a prerequisite of philosophical thinking. All thinking, in 
any area of life and practice, requires us to conceptualize the data of experi-
ence in some way, categorizing data according to diﬀ erent types or patt erns, 
and a great virtue of philosophical thinking is that it enables us to focus on the 
 way we do this, to bring our background assumptions and theories into the 
foreground of thought, to understand how they help us to frame our experi-
ence. That way, we can at least come to consider alternative ways of framing 
experience, alternative ways of seeing the world and characterizing problems. 
Advocates of what is sometimes called the “therapeutic” view of philosophical 
method (Hutchinson,  2008 ) argue that, even when presented with an appar-
ently compelling argument for a given conclusion, we sometimes have a “sus-
picious sense”— the idea that there is something wrong that we cannot quite 
put our fi nger on. The explicit reasoning may be valid, but the object of our 
suspicion may not be what is said as much as the assumptions that underlie it. 
It may not have occurred to us to identify, let alone question, these assumptions 
until now. But until we do so, we cannot free ourselves from their infl uence, 
so we cannot release our potential to think creatively, to explore alternative 
conceptualizations of our circumstances, ones that may prove more valuable 
(Loughlin,  2002 , p. 18). Consider the arguments in Rachel Cooper’s contribu-
tion in this volume ( chapter 11 ), on the nature of disability. A lot hinges on what 
we see as the problem for the disabled person: whether we see that problem 
as located in the person herself, or in the social world in which she is required 
to live her life. Is her diﬃ  culty in moving about in that world a consequence 
of the fact that she is inherently damaged, or is it because that world has been 
designed and constructed without reference to, without due consideration for, 
the need to accommodate her specifi c mode of being? Whatever conclusion we 
come to, we can hardly be said to have given the issue serious consideration if 
we have not even tried out the alternative ways of framing the problem and at 
least started to explore some of their implications for its solution. 
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 Clinical Practice and Theory 
 Returning then to our original questions, we can at least now begin to give some 
qualifi ed answers, to say something about what the philosophy of medicine 
must be if it is to be worth doing. On the one hand, it must not consist in the 
application of preconceived theoretical perspectives to practice, with the goal of 
correcting the perceptions and practices of those involved from an epistemically 
privileged position. The problems it investigates must be problems that arise 
within practice, within the lived experiences of practitioners and patients. On 
the other hand, it cannot take the current consensus on any particular issue— 
be it the nature of medical evidence or clinical reasoning, or the role of value- 
judgments in the diagnosis of medical problems— as an unchallenged given. 
Usual practice may be the necessary starting point for the philosophy of medi-
cine, but that does not mean that this starting point is somehow beyond criti-
cism. Indeed, the more radical movements in the philosophy of medicine have 
been those that took it upon themselves to critique common practices, and to 
argue that the goals of medicine were bett er served by signifi cant— sometimes 
revolutionary— changes in the methods employed by practitioners in diagnos-
ing and treating illness. 
 Any perceived tension between these two constraints upon research meth-
ods in the philosophy of medicine may be resolved by reminding ourselves of 
the point made in the previous section— that our current thoughts and practices 
exist within a history that is ongoing. We are not at the end of this history, in 
a place where all problems and puzzles have been eliminated. At times within 
the history of medicine, there have been problems arising from within practice 
that have not been entirely resolved by the application of business as usual, 
giving rise to a sense that all was not well— a frustration with how things are. 
Theoretical innovation has been one aspect of the continued intellectual evolu-
tion of clinical practice: movements to transform or revolutionize practice have 
been declared by their advocates to be natural responses to medicine’s failure to 
practice consistently, with reference to its own avowed values and standards— 
be they of scientifi c rationality or compassionate humanity. So it was that early 
exponents of EBM appealed to the language of a paradigm shift, a term taken 
from Thomas Kuhn ( 1970 ). They appealed to this language because in Kuhn’s 
work a paradigm shift occurs when those working within a tradition begin to 
recognize that it no longer makes sense in its own terms and that it gives rise 
to problems that it cannot solve. “When defects in an existing paradigm accu-
mulate to the extent that the paradigm is no longer tenable, the paradigm is 
challenged and replaced by a new way of looking at the world” (EBM Working 
Group 1992, p. 2420). Medicine’s desire to treat patients in a way that maxi-
mized the likelihood of achieving the best outcomes was inconsistent with a 
failure to utilize the growing evidence- base made possible by “developments 
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in clinical research over the last 30 years” and its continued reliance instead on 
sources of evidence that were (the authors claimed) inferior (p. 2420). 
 More recently, advocates of “person- centered” approaches to medicine and 
healthcare have argued that contemporary medicine faces “a crisis of knowl-
edge, care, compassion and costs” because “the exaltation of the biomedical 
model of clinical practice has led to a fascination with the molecular and cellular 
basis of disease and organ dysfunction” (Miles and Asbridge,  2013 , p. 1). While 
they acknowledge that “pharmacological and technological innovations have 
mediated huge shifts in individual and population health,” they argue that, hav-
ing at one point facilitated progress, the current dominance of this “biomedical 
reductionism” now stands in the way of the progress that is needed (p. 1). 
 [T] here is a growing sense of unease that all is not well, with observations 
increasingly made that medicine has lost sight of the human dimension of 
illness. An exclusionary participation with the physical and a consequent 
neglect of the psychological, emotional and spiritual dimensions of patient 
care, together with the ongoing shift towards superspecialization, are 
pushing healthcare services into compartmentalization, fragmentation and 
reduction. (p. 1) 
 In each case, problems arising from within clinical practice have (according to 
the authors) required a radical shift in the nature of practice itself. They have 
inspired critical refl ection on the underlying assumptions that frame conven-
tional practice, which give practitioners their sense of what they are doing— the 
purposes, values, and methods of their own practices. These problems have 
caused some to question and re- evaluate at least some of those assumptions, 
and to conclude that business as usual needs to be altered in accordance with 
some new framework. To think in this way about medical practice is to think 
philosophically about medicine. 
 It follows that a fundamental research problem for the philosophy of medi-
cine has been understanding the nature of practice itself. What is clinical 
practice? And, what should it be? Diﬀ erent understandings of practice can be 
characterized in terms of diﬀ erent models, but how should we choose between 
competing models of practice? Even that question contains an assumption 
worth interrogating, that distinct models of practice are in competition, such 
that we must choose between them. Do these models represent alternative and 
mutually incompatible conceptions of practice— of what it is or what it should 
aspire to be— or do they represent distinct but compatible aspects of the correct 
characterization of what clinical practice is or should be? 
 In this section, we tackle each of these questions in turn (returning to the fi nal 
one in the concluding section of the chapter). We discuss what clinical practice 
is and what it should be, by examining the evolution of three infl uential models 
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of clinical practice: EBM, patient- centered medicine (PCM), and values- based 
practice (VBP). Each of these approaches oﬀ ers a new model of clinical prac-
tice and in so doing, locates fault within some aspect of usual clinical practice 
(UP). By examining these models’ portrayals of UP, we can begin to sketch out 
what clinical practice is, and then compare it to at least three versions of what 
it should be. This exercise requires refl ection on what criteria should be used to 
judge UP and these or any other models. 
 What Is Clinical Practice, and What Should It Be? 
 We take UP to be what doctors do in the course of providing care to patients. Its 
goal is the cure or, if not possible, the palliation of disease, accomplished through 
two main objectives: diagnosis and treatment of patients’ problems. Over the 
past 30 years, a variety of new approaches to medical practice or specifi c aspects 
of medical practice have emerged from diﬀ erent corners of the health profes-
sional world. These include EBM, whose origins refl ect synergies between clini-
cal epidemiologists and researchers in internal medicine and critical care; PCM, 
authored by scholars and practitioners in family medicine; and VBP, inspired by 
a specifi c application of philosophy to psychiatric care. In addition, approaches 
to specifi c aspects of clinical practice have also been developed. These include 
shared decision- making, which aims to strengthen the active participation of 
patient and clinician in clinical decision- making; relationship- centered care, 
which emphasizes the importance of the quality of the clinician– patient rela-
tionship for both clinical care and on health outcomes; and the patient– partner 
movement, which aims to increase patient participation and leadership in indi-
vidual care as well as to incorporate patients’ voices into clinical service devel-
opment, health professional education, and research planning.  7  
 In this section, we focus specifi cally on EBM, PCM, and VBP, because they 
represent models of clinical practice, which— if not complete— are intended 
to be comprehensive.  8  In addition, these models are well- known and infl uen-
tial: their theoretical foundations and practical applications have been well- 
documented, enshrined in policy documents and guidelines in health services 
across the globe. 
 Evidence- based Medicine 
 The phrase “evidence- based medicine” fi rst appeared in the published medical lit-
erature in the early 1990s and since then has become a dominant discourse in clinical 
practice. Although it can count at least a few distinct sources of intellectual inspira-
tion, the principles of its current iteration (1992 onward) were articulated through 
the application of the methods of clinical epidemiology to clinical problems. It has 
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been taken up across the medical specialties and has even expanded into health 
services and policy evaluation. EBM has also generated enormous debate because, 
in part, of its portrayal of UP. Compared to “the traditional paradigm of medical 
practice,” EBM’s proponents place lower value on unsystematic clinical experi-
ence, pathophysiologic rationale, and authority (Guyatt  et al.,  2008 , p. 10). These 
proponents characterize UP as a situation in which practitioners engage in clini-
cal decision- making about patient care, often guided by sources of information of 
dubious epistemic value, or even to the detriment of patients’ health. 
 Why would clinicians practice in such a manner? EBM’s advocates located 
the fault both in medical training and in UP. Traditionally, medical training did 
not teach trainees how to understand clinical research studies, interpret their 
data, and then apply these data to clinical decisions. These trainees would then 
go on to the milieu of UP, which lacked mechanisms to require or even to pro-
mote these activities. By contrast, EBM teaches physicians that decisions about 
diagnostic tests, prognostication, which treatments to oﬀ er, and the prediction 
of harm should be guided by research studies; that certain types of research 
studies produce data that are more valid (defi ned as “closeness to truth”) than 
others; and that research methods and the data they yield can therefore be 
ranked hierarchically. The specifi c steps involved in practicing EBM include: 
 1. Converting the need for information (about prevention, diagnosis, prog-
nosis, therapy, causation, etc.) into an answerable question; 
 2. Tracking down the best evidence with which to answer that question; 
 3. Critically appraising that evidence for its validity (closeness to the truth), 
impact (size of the eﬀ ect), and applicability (usefulness in our clinical 
practice); 
 4. Integrating the critical appraisal with clinical expertise and with the 
patient’s unique biology, values, and circumstances; and 
 5. Evaluating the eﬀ ectiveness and eﬃ  ciency in executing steps 1 to 4 and 
seeking ways to improve them for the next time. (Strauss et al.,  2011 , p. 3) 
 By learning the principles of EBM and the skills needed to put them into prac-
tice, practitioners would be able to achieve two things: 
 1. Base their own clinical decisions on valid sources 
 2. Argue against ill- founded practices being used by others 
 EBM does not question the goal of medicine (cure or palliation of disease). 
Instead, it reminds readers that the physician’s job is to ensure that patients 
are presented with valid research data in the service of meeting these objec-
tives, during the process of clinical decision- making. Nor does EBM question 
the objectives of clinical practice (diagnosis and treatment of disease); but, it 
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contends that following its rules enables practitioners to meet these objectives 
more eﬀ ectively. According to EBM, clinical practice should be evidence- based 
practice in equipping clinicians with the skills to practice in accordance with its 
rules. Thus, EBM oﬀ ers an epistemic remedy to UP. 
 Patient- centered Medicine 
 There are now several movements that go by similar names: PCM, patient- 
centered care (Berwick,  2009 ), and person- centered medicine. The relationships 
between them are still a matt er for debate, with some exponents stressing the 
similarities and others arguing that the language of  person - centeredness repre-
sents a broader approach than PCM. Historically, the concept of a patient repre-
sented a semantic contrast to that of an agent, and so the traditional distinction 
in medicine between practitioner and patient arguably reveals philosophical 
presuppositions that may be questioned.  9  As James Marcum notes (in  chapter 10 
of this volume) “person- centred” approaches are infl uenced by philosophical 
work on personalism, emphasizing the “agency” and “inter- subjectivity” of all 
parties to the clinical encounter. In this section, we focus primarily on PCM 
since it is an important historical point of reference for other related movements 
(Suchman,  2005 ; Mezzich,  2011 ). 
 PCM was born in the milieu of Canadian family medicine, which was, and 
remains, a key entry point for accessing health services. Many of these patients 
have complex psychosocial needs falling outside the boundaries of UP. PCM 
is by its own terms “a new clinical method.” The term “patient- centered” 
stands in contrast to the characterization of UP, which PCM advocates argue 
is disease- centered. By this is meant that the goals of clinical practice should be 
to go beyond those of UP, in order to address some of these additional needs. 
PCM advocates aim to improve clinical practice by expanding UP’s objectives 
of diagnosis and treatment to include understanding the person, meaning the 
patient’s experience of illness, concept of good health, and social context. PCM 
places the patient’s account of health and illness on an equal footing with the 
doctor’s and with UP’s. This means that the formulation of the problem and 
appropriate targets for therapeutic intervention ought to be negotiated with 
patients. PCM does not aim to abandon the goal of UP— to cure or palliate 
disease— but instead asserts that patient- centered clinical practice may be more 
successful in achieving this goal than UP itself (Stewart et al.,  2014 , p. 12). 
 Clinicians are to carry out PCM through a series of four complementary 
spheres of action when working with patients: 
 1. Exploring health, disease and the illness experience; 
 2. Understanding the whole person; 
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 3. Finding common ground; and 
 4. Enhancing the patient– clinician relationship. (Stewart et al.,  2014 , p. 7) 
 At the same time, PCM’s advocates are committ ed to EBM, believing that PCM 
is compatible with it, and indeed incorporates it. They do not view EBM as a 
clinical method as such but instead as a method for “acquiring the best avail-
able evidence” about issues in healthcare that can then be used in the practice 
of PCM (p. 15). Yet, it is not clear how this compatibility works in practice. For 
example, one of PCM’s four components is fi nding common ground with the 
patient, including formulation of the problem and identifying the goals of treat-
ment. EBM is oriented toward determining which interventions are most eﬀ ec-
tive toward achieving certain outcomes, both the interventions and outcomes 
having been preselected by researchers of the studies that clinicians are meant 
to consult. But what if patients want an intervention that is not evidence- based 
or to pursue unstudied outcomes? How does the physician practicing PCM, 
seeking to fi nd common ground, reconcile his or her approach to EBM at that 
point? Does the PCM practitioner practice EBM until the patient rejects some-
thing that EBM promotes? Does this mean PCM practitioners can take or leave 
EBM depending on the particular circumstances? 
 This is no doubt one reason why some contemporary exponents of the 
approach write under the label person- centered medicine (see  chapter 10 by 
Marcum) and prefer the terminology of evidence- informed to evidence- based 
medicine (Miles and Loughlin, 2011). These exponents note that the concept of 
evidence in EBM has been modifi ed from a very broad, common- language con-
ception (where evidence simply refers to any piece of information that gives us 
a reason to believe a conclusion— such as your mother’s facial expression and 
mannerisms giving you reason to believe she is unhappy) to a more specialist, 
scientifi c conception of evidence, closely associated with the fi ndings of clini-
cal research. They prefer to treat medicine as a human practice “informed by” 
science, and not as a science or a practice “based on” scientifi c evidence, and 
they maintain that “excellence in clinical practice will remain out of reach until 
clinicians apply advances in biomedicine and technology within a humanistic 
framework of care” (Miles and Ashbridge,  2014 , p. 3). 
 Values- based Practice 
 VBP builds on the work of the philosopher and psychiatrist Bill Fulford, who 
developed the approach in the United Kingdom in the early 2000s. While 
Fulford initially targeted mental health practice, he believes that VBP can apply 
across specialties and health professions. VBP’s central idea is that patients 
and practitioners alike hold diverse values that may come into confl ict in the 
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course of clinical decision- making. VBP fi nds fault in UP’s lack of recognition 
of this diversity of values and portrays decision- making in UP as a process 
through which physicians may impose professional, institutional, social, or 
even personal values on patients’ decision- making. At best, patients might be 
able to accept or refuse physician- recommended interventions through legal 
mechanisms, such as the requirement for informed consent. But Fulford does 
not see a legalistic approach as serving the needs of the ongoing, collaborative 
process of clinical decision- making that is required in the domain of mental 
health, where there is greater diversity about such value- laden questions as 
what constitutes good health. According to Fulford ( 2011 , p. 977), VBP is a 
tool whose goal is to facilitate balanced judgments in individual cases where 
values are complex and confl icting. While VBP does not reject diagnosis and 
treatment as the objectives of clinical practice, it adds its own objective, which 
is to recognize the diversity of individual values and to incorporate this diver-
sity through its specifi c approach to clinical decision- making. But apart from 
seeking to implement its decision- making process, VBP does not promote 
any specifi c goal. The goals of practice arise in clinical encounters from VBP 
deliberation. 
 Like EBM and PCM, VBP oﬀ ers a series of elements that comprise the prac-
tice. These include four practice skills: 
 1. Awareness of values 
 2. Reasoning about values 
 3. Knowledge of values and facts 
 4. Communication 
 They also include six claims or principles: 
 1. Services ought to be user- centered 
 2. Multidisciplinarity 
 3. EBM and VBP work together 
 4. We only notice values when there is a problem 
 5. Increasing scientifi c knowledge increases choices that can demonstrate 
divergence in values 
 6. VBP involves providers and users making decisions in partnership 
 Fulford (2014) notes that there are other tools for working with diverse and 
potentially confl icting values in clinical encounters, such as the methods of 
clinical ethics, but he sees clinical ethics as allocating moral authority to rules. 
By contrast, VBP believes that moral authority for a given decision can only 
be achieved on a case- by- case basis by giving any and all values a fair hearing 
through an open- ended, deliberative process (pp. 151– 52). 
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 Fulford states that VBP works alongside EBM. The complementarity of the 
two approaches is emphasized by the claim that medicine rests on the “two 
feet” of evidence (as characterized by EBM) and values (as revealed by the 
processes explained in the literature on VBP) (Peile,  2014 , pp. 24– 25). While 
VBP recognizes the pervasiveness of values in health practice, it claims that 
EBM represents the facts of medicine. As noted in the previous section, this 
att empt to divide practical reasoning in medicine into two distinct components 
(albeit both needed for decision- making)— regarding the facts, as revealed by 
scientifi c research and regarding the values of the parties involved, ascer-
tained through the processes of VBP— is contentious, with some arguing it 
represents a false dichotomy (Tonelli,  2014 ). This categorization also seems to 
ignore the values that underlie EBM, such as the values underlying the pro-
cess of knowledge production and its products, including the research data 
that are the basis of evidence- based practice. If values are pervasive in all 
areas of practice, why would EBM be exempt? Furthermore, EBM already 
oﬀ ers its own process for working with values in clinical decision- making 
(Gupta,  2014 ). VBP does not discuss how these two work together. Does it 
propose that in using the VBP method, the clinician should set aside EBM’s 
method for incorporating values? The meaning of the two models working 
alongside each other is not clear. 
 Choosing between Models: Assessment Criteria 
 Each of the three models discussed here oﬀ ers itself as a candidate to replace 
or modify UP. Which, if any, of these models should be chosen? And, on what 
basis? Each model criticizes UP for failing to achieve its goals or for having 
the wrong goals. Because of these failures, each model implies that UP does 
not meet the ends of medicine. While a serious discussion of the ends of medi-
cine lies beyond the scope of this chapter, they have traditionally been related 
to preserving life, relieving suﬀ ering, and promoting fl ourishing. The third of 
these is more contentious than the others, with some claiming that promoting 
fl ourishing (an Aristotelian term related to the idea of “the good life”) equates 
to health enhancement, when the goal of medicine should more modestly be 
disease prevention (Kott ow,  2002 , pp. 78– 79) and others suggesting that, at least 
in some areas (notably mental health) the goal of promoting “the good life” can 
be a recipe for authoritarian practice (Fulford,  2014 , p. 157). Even the fi rst two 
goals may of course be called into question in specifi c cases, for instance, when 
they are thought to be in confl ict. Thus, the debate about the ends of medicine 
cannot be neatly separated from wide- ranging debates about what kind of life 
is worth living, what kinds of suﬀ ering are worth relieving, and what kinds of 
fl ourishing should be targeted (if at all). 
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 Do all or any of the three models discussed here achieve the ends of medi-
cine bett er than UP? Do any of the models achieve these ends bett er than any 
other? The models do not concern themselves directly with the question con-
cerning the ends of medicine. Instead, they leave this question untouched but 
rather oﬀ er perspectives on how it might be answered in daily clinical practice 
and by whom. EBM would leave this question to the researchers who produce 
the data to be applied to clinical decisions. By oﬀ ering patients evidence- based 
options, researchers determine what medicine should be about, for whom, and 
under what circumstances. It is not clear where PCM and VBP stand on this 
point. Because of their commitment to EBM, it seems that PCM and VBP accept 
the same state of aﬀ airs, allowing individuals to negotiate and debate their val-
ues regarding the evidence- based options on oﬀ er. Or, it may be that practicing 
in a patient- centered or values- based manner means precisely that EBM can be 
overridden under certain circumstances. 
 If the aforementioned models do not diﬀ erentiate themselves by their ability 
to achieve the ends of medicine, then by what criteria should we judge them 
and assess their ability to serve as models of clinical practice? To compete with 
UP, a candidate model should be comprehensive (cover all the tasks of clinical 
practice), eﬀ ective (be able to achieve what it says it will achieve), and feasible. 
Given that there are practitioners who state that they are practicing according 
to each of the three models, we accept that they are feasible. Here we discuss 
comprehensiveness and eﬀ ectiveness. 
 UP is comprehensive by defi nition as it includes everything that doctors do 
in patient care. Any model of clinical practice should be able to oﬀ er guidance 
on this same terrain. Let us consider one example of an important area of prac-
tice in which guidance by the diﬀ erent models may prove to be insuﬃ  cient 
or confusing, namely, the interface between clinical practice and legal require-
ments. In many jurisdictions, there are aspects of practice framed by law (e.g., 
informed consent). In UP, legal requirements must be respected. Does the same 
stand according to the models? And if so, is this consistent with their own logic? 
 Suppose researchers could conduct a clinical trial to evaluate the eﬀ ective-
ness of obtaining informed consent (defi ned as bett er informed and more 
health- promoting clinical decision- making) in a specifi c patient group (patients 
with generalized anxiety disorder). In the trial, the patients who participate 
in the informed consent process fi nd it anxiogenic, refuse treatment, and end 
up feeling worse (more anxious), while those who do not participate in the 
process accept the treatment and get bett er. How should the evidence- based 
practitioner handle this situation? Should the practitioner advocate against 
informed consent for such patients because the evidence- based option seems 
to lead to bett er health, or opt to ignore the evidence because that is what is 
legally required? The patient- centered practitioner would come to understand 
that the patient feels overwhelmed by too much information about risk and 
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would prefer to accept the doctor’s recommendation rather than engage in the 
informed consent process. Does this give the patient- centered practitioner war-
rant to omit the informed consent process? Or would the physician have to 
default to UP, because PCM does not cover this aspect of practice? Meanwhile, 
the values- based practitioner would encourage an open discussion of the values 
at stake: the patient’s trust in the physician’s recommendation versus the physi-
cian’s duty to respect the law. But before any true deliberative process could 
occur, the practitioner would simply have to overrule the patient’s values due 
to the legal prescription. The point here is that if a model of clinical practice is 
 not comprehensive, the practitioner has no choice but to default to UP for those 
areas that are not covered. Therefore, in order to evaluate a model, we need to 
know which areas of practice are covered, and under what circumstances. 
 Any model of practice should also be eﬀ ective, that is, it should achieve what 
it claims to be able to achieve. Here we refer back to the goals of each model. Are 
they able to achieve their goals? How do we tell? EBM proponents state that its 
eﬀ ectiveness cannot be evaluated according to its own standards of evidence, 
but point to certain RCTs that demonstrated that treatments previously thought 
to be eﬀ ective were actually harmful (Gupta,  2014 , p. 125). Alternatively, they 
claim that the ultimate goal of EBM is to be good at implementing the fi ve- 
step procedure outlined earlier (Strauss et al.,  2011 , p. 3). PCM’s exponents, 
meanwhile, report on the evaluation of their model through various research 
methods (Stewart et al.,  2014 , pp. 333– 75) including the standards of EBM 
(pp. 346– 52). They argue that systematic reviews show that training practition-
ers in patient- centered interaction improves elements of practitioner communi-
cation and patients’ health outcomes (pp. 346– 51). VBP’s proponents agree that 
this kind of empirical base is necessary for VBP as well (Fulford, 2013 , p. 543). 
UP can meet its goal— cure or palliate disease— sometimes. Whether or not the 
models do the same, do it bett er, or do something altogether diﬀ erent remains 
to be seen. 
 Summary 
 In the past few decades, numerous commentators have surveyed the domain 
of clinical practice and found it lacking in its goals, its objectives, or its meth-
ods for achieving them. Various new models of practice have been developed, 
and the three models discussed here have received considerable att ention 
and resources from the clinical community, health policy- makers, and clini-
cal researchers. Their emergence and infl uence raise a number of philosophical 
questions including what clinical practice is, what it should be, and how we can 
know if any new model is a good model of clinical practice or not. The models 
cannot be adequately assessed in isolation from broader assumptions about the 
9781474233002_txt.indd   45 8/10/2016   8:27:35 PM
The Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Medicine
46
46
ends of medicine, and it is also worth noting that they embody conceptions of 
the relationship between medicine and science, as well as the nature of science 
as applied to medical practice. 
 Science and Medicine 
 We have seen that some authors argue that medicine is not a science but a 
value- laden practice informed by science, and that this distinction is crucial to 
the right understanding of medicine. Although the role that science can play 
in medicine, and the specifi c sciences that are most useful and relevant, are 
both open to debate, there is no doubt that medicine relies on the results of 
scientifi c research. This section sketches some of the scientifi c areas that are of 
current interest to philosophers, briefl y outlining some of the questions being 
addressed, and then turns to the broader question of what philosophy of sci-
ence can say about the contribution that science can and should make to clinical 
practice and to health policy. 
 There are two major kinds of medical research: (1) population- level research, 
including clinical research that draws on epidemiological methods to examine the 
relationship between risk factors and/ or interventions, on the one hand, and clini-
cal outcomes, on the other; and (2) pathophysiological research, which involves 
investigating disease processes (and, to a lesser extent, the mechanism of action 
of interventions). Diﬀ erent disciplines and research areas tend to focus on one or 
the other of these approaches, though, as we show later, the extent to which they 
incorporate information from the other approach, and/ or assumptions about 
what is occurring at the other (population or mechanism) level, will vary. 
 Two sets of related philosophical questions can be asked about the biomedi-
cal sciences. One set focuses on the sciences themselves, while the other looks 
at the role of the sciences in clinical medicine. We begin with the second set of 
questions. Philosophers of medicine have distinguished between rationalist and 
empiricist approaches to medicine. Medical rationalism focuses on understand-
ing disease mechanisms and is therefore closely aligned with the physiologi-
cal research described earlier. Medical empiricism, by contrast, is described as 
being concerned with patient outcomes (Newton,  2001 ), independent of exam-
ining and understanding the mechanisms that give rise to those outcomes, and 
with the careful description and categorization of clinical phenomena (Wulﬀ  
et al.,  1990 , p. 33). Although many areas of biomedical research that take an 
empiricist approach focus on populations, the link between medical empiri-
cism and population- level research is not as close as that between physiological 
research and medical rationalism, as we show later. 
 Wulﬀ  et al. ( 1990 ) describe historical approaches to medicine in terms of 
this dichotomy, though they use the term “realism” instead of “rationalism.” 
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They suggest that historically, medicine has been dominated by speculative 
realism. This philosophical approach to medicine has involved the develop-
ment of theories regarding the causes of disease. The most famous of these is 
the Hippocratic system, according to which diseases were understood as imbal-
ances in the body’s four humors. This system is realist, because it posits the 
existence of an underlying disease mechanism, and it is speculative because its 
followers believed that “it was possible by armchair reasoning alone to ascer-
tain the nature of that disease mechanism” (p. 31). Similarly, some forms of 
medical empiricism do not take suﬃ  cient account of medical rationalism; Wulﬀ  
et al. point to att empts in the eighteenth century to categorize diseases with-
out reference to the underlying disease mechanisms. The classifi cation systems 
amounted to “no more than divisions and subdivisions of ill- defi ned symptoms, 
and they had no lasting eﬀ ect on the development of modern medicine” (p. 34). 
Wulﬀ  et al. describe the ideal approach as one of “realism under empirical con-
trol” (p. 32); when this occurs, the search for disease mechanisms is not specu-
lative, but is based on careful observation and often also on experimentation. 
 Both the empiricist concern with observation and the realist concern with 
mechanisms can be observed in contemporary medicine and medical research. 
Until very recently, medical research took a rationalist approach by focusing on 
physiological knowledge. Newton ( 2001 ) att ributes this in part to the infl uence 
of the Flexner report, published in 1910. Although the purpose of the report 
was to examine medical education, Flexner’s emphasis on the importance of 
understanding the mechanisms of disease “created a template of medicine, in 
which the high priests are scientists who illuminate the basic processes of dis-
ease” (p. 303). Medical school curricula and clinical training were both focused 
on understanding disease mechanisms. 
 As we have seen, our understanding of what it means to have a scientifi c 
understanding of medical causation has, since the early 1990s, been massively 
infl uenced by medical empiricism, in the form of EBM. One of the most famous 
defi nitions of EBM is “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of cur-
rent best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients” 
(Sackett  et al., 1996, p. 71)— a defi nition that might well lead us to assume that 
EBM considers any form of evidence to be relevant, when in practice, the rel-
evant evidence comes from well- designed studies that rank high on EBM’s 
hierarchy of evidence. Moreover, most of what has been writt en about EBM, 
by its proponents in both medicine and philosophy, has focused on studies that 
examine treatments (as opposed, e.g., to prognosis, or to diagnostic tests). 
 According to the evidence hierarchy for treatment studies, the best evidence 
comes from systematic reviews or meta- analyses of RCTs, or, where only one 
study is available, a single RCT. Nonrandomized studies (reviews of multiple 
studies, then a single study) fall below this on the hierarchy. Note that all of the 
top levels of the hierarchy look at treatment outcomes in groups of patients; 
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the methods here are similar to those used in epidemiology (we return to this 
point later). Below these studies come case reports and case series (refl ecting 
the unsystematic observations of a single clinician or a small group of clini-
cians) and then research from laboratory studies that examines physiological 
processes or outcomes. 
 Philosophers have both defended and criticized EBM.  10  Here, we use the 
hierarchy of evidence to introduce questions about the potential contributions 
of population- level research and physiological research to medicine. As noted, 
EBM’s hierarchy of evidence claims that the best research evidence comes from 
population- level studies that examine outcomes in large groups of people who 
receive an intervention of interest, comparing them with outcomes in a similar 
control group. This basic study approach— examining the relationships between 
potential causal factors and health eﬀ ects in populations of patients— comes 
from epidemiology. As we have seen, the roots of EBM lie in an earlier move-
ment called “clinical epidemiology” (Feinstein,  1985 ; Sackett  et al.,  1985 ), which 
explicitly aimed to use the techniques of epidemiology in clinical research. 
 Yet there are important diﬀ erences between epidemiology and clinical 
research. First, clinical research tends to focus specifi cally on one cause, the 
intervention being tested, while epidemiology takes into account the eﬀ ects of 
a number of diﬀ erent factors on disease outcomes. Second, epidemiology is 
closely related to public health, which aims to improve outcomes in popula-
tions, rather than in individuals, while clinical research is intended to inform 
decision- making in the care of individual patients. Because of this, Last ( 1988 ) 
claims that “clinical epidemiology” is an oxymoron. 
 Philosophical discussions of epidemiology, therefore, share some issues 
with discussions of clinical research, but also address distinct questions. Alex 
Broadbent’s chapter in this volume ( chapter 4) surveys current work in phi-
losophy of epidemiology, suggesting that a central issue for both philosophers 
and epidemiologists themselves involves questions about causation. He also 
notes that epidemiology is highly unusual among the sciences, because it does 
not develop a body of theory. While epidemiology may draw heavily on theo-
ries relevant to a specifi c condition or question being investigated, it operates 
via a piecemeal approach, helping itself to whichever theoretical background 
is relevant to the problem at hand. So instead of being defi ned by its specifi c 
body of theory, the defi ning features of this young science are to be found in 
its methods. 
 Given that so much work in the philosophy of science concerns theory devel-
opment, developing a philosophical account of epidemiology raises specifi c and 
interesting challenges for philosophy. Broadbent also notes that epidemiology 
has limitations, that “having identifi ed a disease ‘vector’ or an exposure of inter-
est, epidemiology needs to hand over to laboratory sciences which can tell us 
more about how exactly the exposure works.” This suggests that epidemiology 
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is a purely empiricist approach to medicine, with no interest in understand-
ing physiological mechanisms. But because epidemiology does draw on work 
from other sciences, it incorporates the knowledge obtained from a rational-
ist approach, as well. For example, epidemiological studies may examine the 
eﬀ ects of sex/ gender, age, socioeconomic status, comorbidities, or genetic/ 
genomic make up on health outcomes. All of these characteristics presumably 
are linked to diﬀ erences in the underlying physiological mechanisms, though 
we can recognize the infl uence of the characteristics even without understand-
ing the mechanisms themselves. It is worth noting that the interaction with 
rationalist research is another characteristic that distinguishes epidemiology 
from EBM, at least when it comes to research on the eﬀ ects of treatment. Since 
EBM focuses on diﬀ erences between average outcomes in treatment and in con-
trol groups, and does not tend to address questions about the eﬀ ects of social, 
demographic, or biological characteristics on outcomes within study groups, it 
can be characterized as a shallow form of empiricism, compared with a deeper 
form of empiricism that uses knowledge of mechanisms to help to understand 
the sources of variability in outcomes. 
 In fact, there are areas of medical research that are defi ned by the specifi c 
health- related factors on which they focus; two chapters in this volume look 
more closely at specifi c factors that are relevant to health. Tania Gergel (in 
 chapter 9 ) examines gender medicine and Marianne Boenink (in  chapter 3 ) 
assesses personalized medicine. Gender medicine has recently become an area 
of great interest among medical researchers. It was inspired in part by the rec-
ognition that much of the research being done in biomedicine used only male 
subjects. While clinical trials have been required to enrol both women and 
men for some time now, these studies still do not always investigate whether 
there are diﬀ erences in treatment outcomes for the two groups. Personalized 
medicine aims toward an ideal in which knowledge about individual genetic/ 
genomic characteristics and diﬀ erences in molecular biology permit the refi ne-
ment of estimates of health risks and prognosis, and the tailoring of treatment 
to an individual’s biological characteristics. While both Gergel and Boenink 
raise important questions about the assumptions that underlie their respective 
topics, as well as their potential implications for health and medicine, from the 
perspective of Wulﬀ  et al. ( 1990 ), gender medicine and personalized medicine 
both have promise as approaches that represent “realism under empirical con-
trol.” Both areas of research take into account knowledge of physiological dif-
ferences and their eﬀ ects on outcomes. 
 Another area of recent interest in biomedical research, one that focuses 
mainly on population- level explanations, is evolutionary or Darwinian medi-
cine. Evolutionary medicine draws on evolutionary biology to understand 
human health and disease. Its central tenet is that pathophysiology and the vul-
nerability to disease should be understood in terms of trade- oﬀ s that secured 
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other evolutionary advantages. Moreover, it claims that contemporary health 
problems are often the result of changes in our environment and lifestyles, 
which of course change much more rapidly than our genome, so that there is a 
mismatch between the environment to which the human genome was adapted 
and the one in which it currently functions. 
 Pierre Méthot ( 2011 ,  2015 ) distinguishes between (a broad conception of) 
evolutionary medicine and a narrower Darwinian medicine. He describes the 
former as a “forward looking” att empt to predict the eﬀ ects of evolutionary 
processes on human health; it considers not just human evolutionary history 
but ongoing evolutionary changes in microorganisms that are relevant to 
infectious disease and antibiotic resistance. This approach overlaps in interest 
with epidemiology, since it examines current patt erns of disease. By contrast, 
Darwinian medicine is “backwards looking” in that it “applies evolutionary 
principles from the vantage point of humans’ distant biological past in order to 
assess present states of health and disease” (Méthot,  2015 , pp. 587– 88). 
 Although evolutionary medicine looks at populations and at variability in 
outcomes, it also has an interest in explaining how these outcomes came about. 
It therefore has some rationalist and some empiricist tendencies. But instead of 
seeking the specifi c causes of an outcome at a physiological level, it focuses on 
processes that underlie evolutionary change in general. Darwinian medicine, as 
the name suggests, focuses primarily on the processes of adaptation and natu-
ral selection. Valles ( 2012 ) has criticized the focus on adaptation, arguing that it 
distorts research in the fi eld (see also Cournoyea,  2013 ). Evolutionary medicine, 
by contrast, considers a wider range of biological processes relevant to evolu-
tion, including symbiosis and epigenetics (Méthot,  2015 ). It may therefore not 
be subject to these criticisms.  11  
 This section has surveyed a number of important areas of biomedical research 
and has briefl y discussed some of the philosophical questions they raise. Two 
key aspects of the discussion have been that (1) biomedical research tends to 
focus on either health outcomes in populations or on the physiological mecha-
nisms that produce these outcomes; and (2) there are two distinct orientations 
to medicine: empiricist and rationalist. While these are, at least to some extent, 
naturally allied with one of the two broad approaches to research (empiricism 
with population level research, and rationalism with research on physiological 
mechanisms), we have suggested that most areas of biomedical research do 
(and should) incorporate some aspects of both rationalism and empiricism. 
 Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Medicine 
 The previous section discussed a number of current trends in medical research, 
addressing some of the philosophical questions they raise and pointing out 
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their philosophical commitments. In this section, we turn to developments 
within philosophy itself, in particular to the ways in which recent work in phi-
losophy of science is beginning to be used in philosophy of medicine. 
 Over the past decade or so, there has been a resurgence of interest in medi-
cine among philosophers of science. We outline briefl y several areas of research 
in philosophy of science that are particularly relevant to philosophy of medi-
cine. These include both traditional questions (including the nature of scien-
tifi c theories, the confi rmation of theories by evidence, and the establishment of 
causal relationships) that are relevant to assessing biomedical research, regard-
less of its specifi c methods or discipline. In addition, there are some areas of 
philosophy of science that have developed more recently and are relevant to 
medicine, specifi cally the focus on scientifi c pluralism and questions about the 
nature and roles of values in science. 
 The distinction between population- level research and research on physi-
ological mechanisms is relevant in philosophy of science, as well as in medical 
research itself. We noted earlier that the philosophy of science has traditionally 
been centrally concerned with theories. While this is true, it is an oversimplifi ca-
tion, as there are a variety of approaches to understanding what a theory is, and 
how theories are related to other concepts, such as laws of nature, or models. 
The syntactic view of theories, which dates back to logical empiricism, views 
theories as a set of statements (many of which represent laws of nature), while 
the semantic view sees theories as a set of models. A more recent development 
is the focus on mechanisms, which are usually described as explanations, rather 
than as theories (Craver,  2002 ). The basic idea underlying this approach is that 
scientists working in the life sciences do not primarily att empt to develop theo-
ries, but rather to elucidate physiological mechanisms. 
 Although there are a number of ways of describing what a mechanism is, 
one prominent view is that “[m] echanisms are entities and activities organized 
such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set- up to fi n-
ish or termination conditions” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3). Another important 
feature of mechanistic explanations is that they are inherently multilevel. The 
entities that make up one level of the mechanism are themselves composed of 
other entities, which work together in a mechanism to allow the higher- level 
entity to contribute to the function of the higher- level mechanism. That is, an 
entity itself can be viewed as a mechanism, the output of which is the activity of 
the higher- level entity. For example, a cell is composed of a number of molecu-
lar components that contribute to the activity of the cell, allowing it to take its 
place in a mechanism. 
 Although the new mechanism has been very infl uential in philosophy of sci-
ence, relatively litt le work on mechanisms has been done to date in the philoso-
phy of medicine itself. One question has to do with the nature of mechanisms 
of disease: for example, Mauro Nervi ( 2010 ) has argued that these should be 
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considered as distinct mechanisms, while Sara Moghaddam- Taheri ( 2011 ) has 
argued that pathological mechanisms should be understood as broken normal 
mechanisms. This question is still not entirely sett led. One interesting way that 
the question might be answered is by linking discussion of physiological mech-
anisms to other questions in philosophy of science/ philosophy of medicine. For 
example, Justin Garson ( 2013 ) has drawn on work in philosophy of biology that 
examines biological functions in evolutionary terms; the idea is that a mecha-
nism has a normal function in virtue of its evolutionary history. This suggestion 
seems to weigh in favor of the broken normal view. 
 To date, however, most of the discussion of mechanisms in philosophy of 
medicine has been infl uenced by work on EBM and has addressed the question 
of the extent to which physiological research on mechanisms (which is near the 
bott om of the hierarchy of evidence) can inform treatment decisions, whether 
instead of, or as a supplement to, clinical trials (Andersen,  2012 ; Bluhm,  2013 ; 
Howick,  2011 ; Howick et al.,  2013 ). Recall that EBM, with its focus on RCTs and 
meta- analyses, is an empiricist approach to medicine, while the elucidation of 
physiological mechanisms is rationalist. Contemporary rationalism is not like 
the theory- heavy, armchair speculative realism criticized by Wulﬀ  et al. ( 1990 ). 
Rather, it is based on experimentation and careful observation. Yet, it is still not 
clear what kind or amount of physiological knowledge is required to support 
predictions of clinical outcomes. 
 The question of predicting outcomes is related to the question of what kind 
of research evidence is necessary to establish causal claims in medicine. The 
ability to make claims about causality is important in all areas of science. As 
described earlier, physiological research focuses primarily on understanding 
the causes of disease in terms of the mechanisms that lead to the signs and 
symptoms of it (and, to a lesser extent, on elucidating the mechanism of action 
of treatments). Epidemiological studies examine the infl uence of potential risk 
factors (i.e., causes) on disease occurrence. Using similar methods, clinical trials 
aim to determine whether a therapeutic intervention causes improvement in 
patient outcomes. Philosophical discussions about causality in medicine have 
att empted to clarify the contributions that each of these kinds of research can 
make to our knowledge of causes. 
 One debate centers on whether RCTs can provide any information about 
causes. Proponents argue that RCTs, as opposed to observational studies, are 
necessary to show that a treatment causes an outcome of interest, because 
only RCTs can control appropriately for the infl uence of confounding factors. 
Cartwright argues, however, that RCTs can only support causal claims if we 
build knowledge of causes (or assumptions about what causal factors are rel-
evant) into our experimental design, and that mere statistical associations can 
only be taken to be evidence of causal relations if we already have some idea of 
what the causal relationships are (e.g., Cartwright and Hardie,  2012 ). 
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 Recent discussions have been strongly infl uenced by what has come to be 
known as the “Russo– Williamson thesis”— after the arguments presented in 
Russo and Williamson ( 2007 )— which claims that both knowledge of mecha-
nisms and knowledge of the statistical relationship between risk factors/ 
interventions and outcomes are necessary to obtain causal knowledge in the 
health sciences. Statistical evidence linking causes and eﬀ ects is required to 
show that the occurrence of an eﬀ ect does depend on the presence of the cause. 
Mechanisms give us knowledge that a statistical relationship observed in a 
study sample is not merely limited to that sample, or to the specifi c circum-
stances in which the statistical relationship was observed. 
 In addition, it is important to realize that, to some extent, causal claims are 
always limited to specifi c circumstances. This fact has important implications 
for the use of biomedical and clinical research to inform policy and practice. 
Scientifi c research is designed to isolate specifi c causal factors of interest, 
whether in the carefully controlled conditions of a laboratory, or in social science 
and epidemiological research that uses statistical controls. This research does 
not, however, give suﬃ  cient information to predict how these causes operate in 
the very diﬀ erent contexts in which the policy is implemented. Cartwright, for 
example, cautions that while scientifi c studies can show that a policy “works 
somewhere,” much more information is needed to warrant the claim that the 
policy also “works here” (Cartwright and Hardie,  2012 ). 
 Pluralism, Science, and Values 
 Ultimately, the sciences described claim that they can contribute to improved 
health, whether by directly infl uencing patient care and/ or by contributing to 
the development of public health policies. But within each of these sciences, as 
we have shown, there are disagreements and controversies. These issues take 
on additional complexity when we look at all of the sciences together, since they 
use very diﬀ erent methods and focus on distinct aspects of biology or medical 
intervention. One of the most pressing problems in contemporary philosophy 
of science is understanding how to integrate the fi ndings of diﬀ erent sciences 
and scientifi c approaches. 
 During the mid- twentieth century, the heyday of logical empiricism, philos-
ophy of science was guided by the assumption that, as science progressed and 
provided more knowledge of the natural and social worlds, scientifi c theories 
would converge to provide a unifi ed body of knowledge. By contrast, many 
contemporary philosophers of science accept some form of scientifi c plural-
ism, emphasizing the diversity (both among and within scientifi c disciplines) 
of methods, theories, scientifi c models, and background assumptions about the 
nature of the phenomenon being studied. This diversity infl uences both the 
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results of research and its interpretation, leading some philosophers to con-
clude that it is impossible to draw any general conclusions that transcend the 
myriad specifi c scientifi c contexts within which a phenomenon is investigated 
(Longino,  2013 ). 
 Related to this point are questions about the diﬀ erent sorts of value- 
judgment that underlie and motivate scientifi c research. An obvious focus for 
this approach in philosophy of medicine has to do with the role of commer-
cial interests, e.g., pharmaceutical and biotech companies, in shaping medi-
cal research and its uptake in clinical practice. However, even leaving aside 
commercial issues, a host of social, cultural, and political values may infl uence 
medical research at numerous stages, including questions about which areas 
become priorities and receive research funding, about what kinds of studies are 
considered to provide good evidence, and about how much evidence is needed 
before clinical practice should be changed. 
 Conclusion: The Search for the Base or Center 
 It seems clear then that medicine is informed by a broad variety of approaches 
in science, and no one methodology can claim to be defi nitive of the whole range 
of studies, theories, and practices that legitimately qualify for the descriptor 
“medical.” This is hardly surprising given the richness and diversity of medi-
cal research and practice, and the vast range of problems we are prepared to 
characterize as “medical.” There are also well- defended claims that medicine 
should be informed by a broader range of sources and methods than can sen-
sibly be classifi ed as scientifi c, and/ or that our notion of scientifi c reasoning 
needs to be expanded to incorporate a role for the sort of human capacities and 
dispositions that would qualify as subjective and non- rational in the writings of 
the logical positivists. Several authors in this volume  12   argue that the philoso-
phy of medicine has been impoverished to the extent that it has failed to make 
a systematic study of the humanistic aspects of medical practice, including the 
role of intuitive and tacit knowledge in medical epistemology and phenomeno-
logical approaches to understanding illness and associated problems of mean-
ing, suﬀ ering, and embodiment. It is therefore perhaps no greater a surprise 
that, as noted in our opening comments, there is a diversity of methodologi-
cal approaches within the philosophy of medicine itself, and no one, unifying 
meta- methodology to tell us what the diﬀ erent approaches have in common. 
 Should this strike us as a problem? Apart from being various ways of think-
ing about medical problems, research, and practices, should areas as diﬀ erent as 
the philosophy of epidemiology, medical humanities, and virtue epistemology 
(to name just a few of the distinct and developing areas of medical philosophy) 
have anything in common? If there need be no general, methodological thread 
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linking all of these diﬀ erent approaches, then this does of course create a prob-
lem when it comes to distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate approaches to 
the subject matt er. It means we need to assess each alternative approach as it 
comes, making up our own minds as to its validity and usefulness. We do not 
yet have (nor, arguably, may we ever have) a defi nitive set of rules that simply 
tell us which approaches are legitimate and which are not. 
 It is not, however, clear that this is a problem any rational person should 
expect ever to be solved. Is phenomenology an intellectually respectable and 
practically useful way to inform and enhance our understanding of medical 
problems and practices? The only way to answer that question is to make a 
serious study of work in the area of medical phenomenology, applying one’s 
critical faculties to form a judgment about the quality of the arguments and 
analyses presented. (The reader might begin by studying in detail the chapters 
by Fredrik Svenaeus ( chapter 8 ) and Tania Gergel ( chapter 9 ) in this volume.) 
To think that there must, somewhere, be a list one can consult to bypass this 
process of critical engagement with the specifi cs of the area is to adopt a “repair 
manual” approach to thinking (Loughlin,  2002 , p. 4), to seek exemption from 
the responsibility to form one’s own conclusions, and thus to opt out of the 
processes of reasoning. 
 There are, however, other problems presented by the diversity of methods 
in the medical philosophy. We have seen, in our discussion of the relationship 
between EBM, PCM, and VBP, that there are legitimate questions about the 
extent to which diﬀ erent approaches in the philosophy of medicine are com-
plementary or embody incompatible assumptions. In that discussion, a key 
problem concerned the status of these approaches as distinct models of clinical 
practice, each claiming to be comprehensive accounts of what UP should be. 
The very idea that such a comprehensive account should be the goal of the 
philosophy of medicine may strike many readers as natural, but there are also 
those who question why the giving of a complete account of an area should be 
the goal of all and any serious theoretical enterprise. Considering the names of 
the three approaches mentioned in this paragraph, Ross Upshur (2014a, p. 989) 
comments that in medical philosophy “[t] he persistent desire to name some 
concept or idea as the base or the centre strikes me as misguided in some fun-
damental way. We have seen litt le att ention or discussion about the near mania 
for appellations of this sort.” 
 As we noted earlier (cf. the comments on Toulmin in the opening section), 
philosophy can be construed as either a body of theory or as an activity. We 
argued that its value, certainly in an area such as the philosophy of medicine, 
appears to be as an activity, an engagement with common ideas and practices 
in the area. The philosopher asks critical questions to expose and interrogate 
underlying assumptions that frame debates, with the goal of assisting the pro-
tagonists in understanding their own assumptions and considering possible 
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alternative conceptual frameworks. In medicine this means engaging in dialog 
with practitioners and patients, taking up problems that arise directly from 
their accounts of the problems of practice, and exploring ways of conceptual-
izing the problems, relevant evidence, and potential solutions. But for many 
theorists, the ultimate goal of such an activity must be the production of a com-
plete body of theory, a philosophy of the area. The att raction of this idea may in 
part lie in a comparison with the view of scientifi c progress noted in the closing 
comments of our previous section, that theoretical unity is the ultimate goal of 
science. 
 Whatever its appeal, it explains the motivation to present an account of the 
“base” or “center” of all medical practice, as though explaining an entire and 
extremely diverse area via a single, underlying concept. But as Upshur (2014b, 
pp. 214– 15) notes: 
 Basing or centring medicine on any one thing, be it evidence, persons or 
patients, seems to be a mistaken enterprise. I am not sure what motivates 
the requirement for this and why, for example, evidence, values and persons 
or patients cannot be seen as mutually constitutive. In some circumstances 
evidence, however conceived, may hold more weight than values and 
vice versa. There are contexts where the interests of persons or patients, 
always deserving of respect, may take a subordinate role to the needs of a 
community. 
 Social practices rarely come into existence because some person or group sits 
down, decides we need a practice called X, sets out its defi ning characteristics, 
and then rounds up a group of people whose qualifi cations suggest they are the 
best qualifi ed to create the needed practice. Practices evolve, so there is indeed 
something bizarre about searching retrospectively for their base or foundation. 
If they emerged without having to be at any point founded, then why try to cre-
ate a foundation, center, or unifying concept for them? It may be that theorists 
think that is the only way to explain or make sense of these practices, but in 
that case we need to examine the theorists’ own assumptions about what it is to 
explain or make sense of a practice. 
 Witt genstein’s ( 1958 , p. 31) instruction “Don’t think, but look!” sounds like 
the sort of anti- philosophical declaration we might expect from the blogger 
cited in our opening section, but it is meant to serve as a warning about philo-
sophical methodology that may have relevance to future debates in medical 
philosophy. As Cooper notes in  chapter 11 of this volume, a great deal of work 
in the “philosophy of” medicine has been done att empting to defi ne such key 
concepts as health and disease, but it is possible that no defi nition is ever going 
to capture all legitimate uses of these terms in the various contexts in which 
they operate. They may be what Witt genstein calls “family resemblance terms,” 
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such that understanding their meaning is a matt er of tracking their uses in the 
range of contexts in which people employ them, understanding their contribu-
tion to the forms of life this employment facilitates. To att empt to abstract an 
overall, defi nitive meaning of the term (to stop, as it were, looking and to theor-
ize in the sense meant in the quotation by “thinking”) involves taking termin-
ology out of its specifi c context of use when analyzing its meaning, and there 
are dangers associated with this. 
 So, a practitioner might have a very clear sense of what it means for an aspect 
of her practice to be patient- centered, and may be able to explain in a particular 
case how she has applied this idea to the benefi t of her patients. But when she 
fi lls in a management survey aimed at producing more patient- centeredness 
in her area or institution, via the production of general policy documents and 
practice guidelines, she may fi nd that the answers she has given lead to policies 
and regulations that, far from facilitating her eﬀ orts in this area, actually inhibit 
them. This may not be because the survey’s respondents are being inconsistent 
or “don’t know what they’re doing,” nor need it be a result of incompetence 
or malice on the part of the managers att empting to base their polices on the 
responses. When language “goes on holiday” (Witt genstein,  1958 , p. 19), mov-
ing out of the context that gave it meaning, only to be recycled, in a diﬀ erent 
context and then fed back to practitioners as an application of some more gen-
eral insight, there can be slippages of meaning, and one role of the philosopher 
of medicine should be to track these possible changes and the problems they 
create for the communication processes in organizations. 
 So if PCM and EBM really do want to demonstrate their mutual compat-
ibility (cf. our discussion of these models in the section “Clinical Practice and 
Theory”), then they may need to moderate their claims about their own status. 
Instead of presenting themselves as comprehensive clinical practice models, 
or general theories of medicine, they might instead regard themselves as dis-
tinct ways of conceptualizing practice that bring to light otherwise neglected 
or deemphasized aspects, leaving it to the judgment of the informed reader of 
their theories to work out which approach makes sense of the specifi c situation 
she is facing. This more modest, but still important, aspiration may be a more 
realistic goal of theory than the att empt to provide a defi nitive theory of any 
given area of practice, and it fi ts with the model of philosophy as an activity, a 
dialog with practitioners, patients, and anyone else with a stake in the practices 
analyzed. 
 Such an approach might arguably be part of a solution to the crisis for EBM 
some of its prominent exponents have recently highlighted (Greenhalgh et al., 
 2014 ). This methodological concern might well be relevant to the developing 
movement for person- centered medicine, discussed at various points in this 
chapter. The last thing this movement needs, we suspect, is a defi nitive account 
of the meaning of the term “person” (which, if it is to be at all plausible, and 
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to serve the declared purposes of the movement, must incorporate the idea of 
rational agency) followed by a discussion of what precisely it means for medi-
cal practices to be centered on such persons— followed swiftly by accusations 
that the movement risks condemning human beings that do not fi t this model 
of personhood to the margins of medical concern and care (Loughlin, 2014). 
The movement’s wholly legitimate eﬀ orts to reestablish the importance of cer-
tain aspects of practice (those deemphasized by the approaches it condemns 
as “reductionist”) will not be served by its declaring itself to be the new candi-
date for the defi nitive “philosophy of” or new “foundation for” the practice of 
medicine. Nor does it need to make such a claim to argue that its proposals for 
framing discussions about medicine in the future represent signifi cant progress 
with regard to what has gone before. (James Marcum takes up these concerns, 
and the use of “base” and “center”, in more detail in  chapter 10.) 
 One factor aﬀ ecting which of the two alternative methodologies the phi-
losopher of medicine adopts was touched on in the conclusion of the previous 
section— the values being served by research. If one sees one’s role as a phi-
losopher as serving the needs of the policy- maker, then the appeal of a new, 
revolutionary insight, the discovery that all of medicine is in fact based on or 
centered in factor X, and a complete defi nition of what X is may well serve the 
purposes of the audience for whom one is writing. But if the purpose is to assist 
“a broader audience” (Loughlin,  2002 p. 151), including practitioners and the 
public, to make sense of a complex and challenging environment, then the more 
modest goal may well also be the more useful one to adopt. 
 Notes 
 1.  David Colquhoun, self- styled “defender of science” and crusader against quackery, 
religious belief, and all things “unscientifi c.” Probably one of the few people on earth 
who actually wants the Westboro Baptist Church to picket his funeral. 
 2.  Why philosophy is largely ignored by science:  htt p:// www.dcscience.net/ 2011/ 10/ 28/ 
why- philosophy- is- largely- ignored- by- science/ (accessed May 8, 2015). 
 3.  Founder of the Westboro Baptist Church, self- styled religious controversialist and 
crusader against all things “ungodly.” Also of the view that critical examination of 
one’s underlying assumptions is a waste of time. 
 4.  The issue is a central preoccupation of several chapters in this volume. See in par-
ticular Marianne Boenink ( chapter 3), Alex Broadbent ( chapter 4), Jeremy Howick 
( chapter 5), and Brendan Clarke and Federia Russo ( chapter 12). 
 5.  A good illustration of a much richer conception of reasoning can be found in Hillel 
Braude’s  chapter 13 on clinical decision- making, appealing to the Aristotelian idea 
of practical wisdom to give an account of what good clinical reasoning consists in. 
 6.  Including some of those who, to use Toulmin’s ( 1982 , p. 749) term, “barbarously” 
embraced the label “ethicists” (Loughlin,  2004 ). 
 7.  See  htt p@// medicine.umontreal.ca/ doc/ PPS_ Rapport_ 2011- 2013.pdf (accessed May 
7, 2015). 
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 8.  Some authors, such as Jeanne Daly ( 2005 ), refer to EBM as a science of clinical prac-
tice rather than a model, but its authors envision its role as going beyond science and 
oﬀ ering techniques to guide actual practice. 
 9.  The defenders of PCM also reject the construal of the patient as the passive recipient 
of treatment and the practitioner as bearing sole responsibility for the decisions and 
outcomes of the process. 
 10.  Jeremy Howick’s  chapter 5 in this volume provides an overview of this literature 
and presents his own analysis. 
 11.  The issues in this area are taken up in much greater detail in Michael Ruse’s  chapter 6 
to this volume. 
 12.  See in particular the chapters by Alfred Tauber ( chapter 7), Lydie Fiolová ( chapter 7a), 
Fredrik Svenaeus ( chapter 8), Tania Gergel ( chapter 9), and Hillel Braude ( chapter 13). 
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